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Autonomous vehicles (AVs) will be on our roads soon. These cars will be designed so that
passengers cannot take manual control in the event of a collision. These cars might encounter
situations where a decision about how to allocate harm between different persons is required
(Goodall, 2014; Lin, 2016). Consider,
The Moral Design Problem: How should manufacturers programme AVs to allocate harm in these
collisions?
In a recent article, Sütfeld et al. (2017) argue that (1) human moral judgements are context
dependent; such that (2) we have good reason to programme AVs to allocate harm in collisions
in accordance with context-sensitive human moral judgements. Given (1) and (2), Sütfeld et al.
conducted an empirical study in which participants were presented with virtual reality collisions,
and data was collected on the participants’ responses to these collisions. In this paper, I raise two
objections to Sütfeld et al.’s approach to the moral design problem.
The first objection: Sütfeld et al.’s argument begins with the following empirical observation:
(A) Human moral intuitions about the conditions under which inflicting harm is morally
permissible differ depending on context.
Sütfeld et al. take (A) as evidence for:
(B) “There is no ground truth in our ethical intuitions which holds irrespective of context.”
It is unclear how (B) should be understood. But I think the most charitable reading is that (B)
is a commitment to a meta-ethical position called particularism (Dancy, 1983). According to
generalism, there exists a set of normative ethical principles which determines the right thing
to do in all situations. Particularism is the negation of this thesis, that is, the right thing to do
is determined on a context-sensitive or case-by-case basis. The status of the evidential relation
between the neuroscientific data that Sütfeld et al. use to establish (A) and meta-ethics has received
little attention (Joyce, 2008). As such, it cannot be taken for granted. Given that Sütfeld et al.’s
answer to the moral design problem depends on the plausibility of this inference, they owe an
account of why this inference is plausible before we are justified in accepting their answer.
Keeling AV Decision-Making in Collisions
The second objection: let us grant that Sütfeld et al.
have determined that the correct meta-ethical account is
particularism. That is, the right thing to do in AV collisions must
be determined on case-by-case basis. Sütfeld et al. propose to
take descriptive about human snap-decisions in virtual reality
collisions as an indicator of how AVs ought to be programmed
in analogous contexts. Either,
(C) Sütfeld et al. are committed to the normative ethical claim
that the right thing to do in AV collisions is determined by
facts about human snap-judgements in analogous collisions;
or
(D) Sütfeld et al. have inferred claims about how AVs ought to
allocate harm in collisions from descriptive claims about how
humans allocate harm in analogous collisions.
It strikes me that (D) is an invalid inference from is to ought.
The fact that something is the case does not entail or suggest
that it ought to be the case. This leaves us with (C). If Sütfeld
et al. are committed to (C), they must explain why the right thing
to do in driverless car collisions is determined by human snap-
judgements in analogous collisions. Is this explanatory burden
problematic? Here is one argument: we might reasonably expect
an AV to be programmed to make better moral decisions in a
collision than human drivers make in analogous collisions. This
is not an empirical claim about how driverless cars will be, but
instead a claim about how humans are. Humans are sensitive to
the pressures of a collision, and under this pressure, our critical
thinking capacities break-down. It is not reasonable to expect a
human tomake an informedmoral judgement under the pressure
of a life-or-death scenario. In contrast, we can reasonably expect
that humans designing AV collision algorithms will not be under
pressures analogous to that of a collision. So, whilst humans do
not make considered moral judgements in collisions, it seems
reasonable to expect an informed moral judgement from the
designers of AV collision-algorithms. And if this is true, it is
unclear why human snap-judgements are relevant to the moral
design problem. Plausibly, we should instead use one of our best
moral theories, such as utilitarianism or contractualism.
It might be objected that both Sütfeld et al. and I have
set aside an important consideration: it cannot be taken for
granted that AV decision-making in collisions will not evolve
over time. Plausibly, AVs could be programmed with an initial
collision algorithm which develops through machine-learning
techniques into a more sophisticated moral decision-making
algorithm over time. If this is true, the question becomes what
moral principles do we programme into the AV at the beginning
of the learning process. In this case, it is still unclear why we
should take human snap-judgements as the starting principles.
Moral philosophy has produced several excellent theories of
moral decision-making, all of which seem like better starting
points than human snap-judgements under pressure. By analogy,
we might grant that AV non-moral decision-making will develop
over time. As a starting point, we could either use one of
our best normative theories for decision-making (e.g., expected
utility theory), or programme the car to behave as humans
would do in analogous circumstances. As significant thought
and reflection has gone in to formulating, say, expected utility
theory, it seems as though we have overwhelming reason to
take it as our starting point, compared with ordinary human
judgements.
In conclusion, Sütfeld et al.’s solution to the moral design
problem rests on a contentious inference from neuroscientific
data to meta-ethical particularism. And even granting the truth
of particularism, it is unclear why we ought to take human snap-
decisions in collisions as an indicator of how AVs ought to be
programmed in analogous collisions.
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